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COMMENTS 
Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal 
Court Judges: 28 U.S.C. § 455 
Disqualification of a judge occurs when he is ineligible by law 
to sit in a particular case.1 At the Supreme Court level, disqualifica-
tion is a personal decision of the individual justice, who seldom 
records the reasons for his decision.2 Thus, there is little material on 
the Court's disqualification practices that can be subjected to legal 
analysis.3 However, substantial case law on disqualification has de-
veloped in the lower federal courts, where the decision of a trial 
judge to sit or step down in a case may appear in the trial record and 
is subject to review by a court of appeals. In addition, disqualifica-
tions in the lower courts may have many important ramifications for 
the parties, the judicial system, and the individual judges.4 This 
Comment will discuss the laws and doctrines that relate to the dis-
qualification of federal judges because they have, or appear to have, 
an interest in the case before them. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUTORY 
STANDARDS 
While the civil law recognized broad grounds for disqualifica-
tion, 5 the common-law approach to the subject was relatively narrow. 
I. The term "recusal" is sometimes used in place of the word "disqualification." 
Although courts and writers do not always seem to differentiate between the two terms, 
John Frank has written that disqualification occurs because of a statutory mandate, 
while recusal is a voluntary act on the part of the judge. See Frank, Disqualification of 
Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 43, 45 (1970). This 
Comment will use the term "disqualification" exclusively. 
The term "interest" will be used to refer to the grounds for disqualification 
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), set out in text accompanying note 12 infra. 
2. See Laird v, Tatum, 41 U.S.L.W. 3208 & n.l (U.S., Oct. 10, 1972) (memorandum 
of Rehnquist, J .). 
3. Disqualification of Supreme Court justices is most recently discussed in Note, 
Justice Rehnquist's Decision To Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 106 
(1973). See also Frank, supra note l; Frank, Conflict of Interest and U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 744 (1970); Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 
605 (1948); Nadelman, Disqualification of Constitutional Court Judges for Alleged Bias1, 
52 JUDICATURE 27 (1968). 
4. The judge's decision may create or add to grounds for appeal, see, e.g., Adams v. 
United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962), or mandamus, see, e.g., Rapp v. Van Dusen, 
350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965). It may also necessitate a retrial of the case, the usual result 
when a judge's decision not to disqualify is overturned on appeal. See, e.g., United States 
v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969). The decision may also affect the judge's 
chances for "promotion" to a higher court. John Frank believes that the failure of the 
Senate to consent to the nomination of Judge Haynsworth to the Supreme Court was 
due partly to his disqualification practices as a member of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. See Frank, supra note 1, at 60. 
5. Perhaps the earliest provision disqualifying judges for interest is found in the 
Code of Justinian: 
Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power yet because it is our 
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The leading English case was Dr. Bonham's Case,6 in which Lord 
Coke ruled that members of a board that determined physicians' 
qualifications could not both impose and personally receive fines. 
Several years later, Lord Coke uttered what has become the classic 
statement of disqualification-"No man can be a judge in his own 
cause."7 As these cases indicate, the common law called for disquali-
fication when a judge was involved in a case as a party or had a direct 
financial interest in the outcome.8 
In the United States, Congress at an early date adopted standards 
for judicial disqualification. In 1792 it enacted a statute requiring 
disqualification in cases where a district judge was in any way "con-
cerned in interest" or had "been of counsel."9 In 1821, an additional 
ground-relationship or connection to a party-was added.10 A 1911 
pleasure that all litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted 
to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion, to recuse him before issue joined, 
so that the cause go to another. 
Corpus Juris Civilis, Codex, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16, translated in Putnam, Recusation, 9 
CORNELL L.Q. I, 3 n.10 (1923). This formed the basis for broad disqualification statutes 
in civil-law countries. See id. at 1-9, 14. 
6. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1609). Earlier, English statutes had recognized one special 
ground for disqualification. In order to prevent favoritism, no judge was permitted to 
try cases in the county wherein he was born. Statute, 8 Rich. 2, c. 2 (1384). Similar pro-
visions are found in Statute, 13 Hen. 4, c. 2 (14II) and Statute, 33 Hen. 8, c. 24 (1541). 
These statutes were not repealed until 1739. Statute, 12 Geo. 2, c. 27. 
7. Earl of Derby's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1390 (K.B. 1614). A similar case, in which a 
judge was imprisoned for attempting to try a case in which he was a party, was recalled 
by Lord Holt while announcing the decision in Wright v. Crump, 87 Eng. Rep. 1055, 
1056 (K.B. 1702). 
8. Bracton and Fleta, two early English legal ,niters, recognized broader grounds 
for disqualifying judges. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •351. When Blackstone 
wrote his treatise in the eighteenth century, he seemed to indicate that there were no 
grounds for disqualifying a judge. Id. His statement has been variously interpreted as 
simply declaring Bracton in error on the extent to which there were grounds available 
for disqualification, see Frank, supra note I, at 43 n.3, or as denying that judges could 
be disqualified on any grounds whatever, see Comment, Disqualification of Judges for 
Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 
48 ORE. L. REv. 3II, 316 (1969). Blackstone's undoubted awareness of Lord Coke's deci-
sions, cited in notes 6 Sc 7 supra, support the former interpretation, but several Ameri-
can courts have been persuaded by the latter. See, e.g., Duncan v. Atlantic Coast Line 
R.R., 223 F. 446 (S.D. Ga. 1915); The Richmond, 9 F. 863 (C.C.E.D. La. 1881). After 
Blackstone's time, disqualification of judges became more common in England as emi-
nent judges voluntarily disqualified themselves when they were connected with a case 
and thereby established precedents. See Ex parte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 987 
(M.D. Ala. 1912). 
9. And be it further enacted, That in all suits and actions in any district court of 
the United States, in which it shall appear that the judge of such court is, any 
ways, concerned in interest, or has been of counsel for either party, it shall be the 
duty of such judge on application of either party, to cause the fact to be entered 
on the minutes of the court, and also to order an authenticated copy thereof, with 
all the proceedings in such suit or action, to be forthwith certified to the next cir-
cuit court of the district, which circuit court shall, thereupon, take cognizance 
thereof, in the like manner, as if it had been originally commenced in that court, 
and shall proceed to hear and determine the same accordingly. 
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, I StaL 278-79. 
IO. Act of March 3, 1821, ch. 51, 8 Stat. 643. 
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amendment provided that a judge was disqualified if he was or had 
been a material witness in the case.11 As part of the general revision 
of the Judicial Code in 1948 the disqualification statute was altered, 
making the interest necessary for disqualification a "substantial" 
interest, adding relationship with or connection to a party's attorney 
as a ground for disqualification, eliminating the need for a party to 
request disqualification, and extending the statute to all United 
States justices and judges. The statute, which is now section 455 of 
title 28, reads: 
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself 
in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of 
counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or 
connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, 
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding 
therein.12 
While this Comment will focus on section 455, there are two other 
statutes that provide for disqualification of federal judges. First, no 
judge sitting on a court of appeals is permitted to hear an appeal 
from a decision of a case or issue tried by him,13 and second, a judge 
before whom a matter is pending in a district court must disqualify 
himself if a party files a legally sufficient affidavit alleging that the 
judge has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in favor of one 
of the adverse parties.14 In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require a judge to disqualify himself in criminal con-
tempt cases if he was the object of the disrespect or criticism that is 
the basis of the contempt charge.15 
Guidelines for disqualification have also been supplied by the 
American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Ethics16 and Code of 
Judicial Conduct.17 The Canons were adopted in 1924 and estab-
11. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090. 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). A similar statute provides for the disqualification of cus• 
toms court judges in cases in which they have previously participated. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2636(c) (1970). 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970). Cases arising under this statute are discussed in Annot., 
13 A.L.R. Fed. 855 (1972). 
14. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); Note, Dis• 
qualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1966). 
For the general background and current state law on disqualification for bias, see Com• 
ment, supra note 8. Section 144 is of comparatively recent origin, having been first 
enacted in 1911. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090. 
15. FJ!D. R. Cru:M. P. 42(b). The judge may sit if the defendant consents to his 
sitting. 
16. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS (1967) [hereinafter ABA OPIN· 
IONs]. This publication contains the original wording and amendments of the Canons 
of Judicial Ethics, and the opinions of the Judges Advisory Committee of the Com• 
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibilty, which interprets the Canons. 
17. ABA CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. The Code was adopted by the ABA House of 
Delegates on August 16, 1972. 
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lished general standards of proper judicial behavior. They called for 
disqualification when a judge had a personal interest in a suit or 
was a near relative of a party.18 The Code, which supersedes the 
Canons, establishes more detailed disqualification standards.19 
18. Canons 29 &: 13. Tangentially related are Canon 4, which counsels against im-
propriety or the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge, and Canon 33, which 
warns a judge to take care in his social relations in order to avoid the appearance of 
fa\'oritism. Generally speaking, the Canons were too vague and general to be of much 
practical use. See Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflec-
tions, 35 LA.w &: CoNTEMP. PRoB. 69, 71 (1970). 
19. Canon 3 of the Code provides in part: 
3C. Disqualification 
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or has personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom 
he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer con-
cerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness 
concerning it; 
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in 
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could 
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either 
of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the Judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the pro-
ceeding; 
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial inter• 
ests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal finan-
cial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. 
(3) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system; 
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, 
and guardian; 
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, how-
ever small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant 
in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securi-
ties is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge 
participates in the management of the fund; 
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic orga-
nization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organiza-
tion; 
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance com-
pany, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar 
proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only 
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value 
of the interest; 
(iv} ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer 
only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the 
value of the securities. 
3D. Remittal of Disqualification. 
A judge disqualified by terms of Canon 3C(l)(c} or Canon 3C(l)(d) may, 
instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of 
his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, indepen-
dently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relation-
ship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the judge is no 
longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed 
by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding. 
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II. DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST: 
LOWER FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE 
Since the basic federal law regarding disqualification for interest 
is found in section 455, a careful analysis will be made of that 
statute. The discussion will focus on three general topics-procedure 
for disqualification, substantive interpretation of section 455, and 
policy considerations relevant in the implementation of the statute. 
A. Procedure Under Section 455 
Several aspects of procedure under section 455 have thus far 
caused little controversy. First, the statute does not preclude a person 
who is not a party in a case from requesting that the judge disqualify 
himself. Under the pre-1948 statute, only a party could move for 
disqualification, and a nonparty, even one who had a personal stake 
in the outcome of the case, could not ask a judge to step down.20 The 
1948 revision embodied in section 455 eliminated this restriction, 
so that now when a judge learns that grounds for his disqualification 
exist, he should disqualify himself regardless of the source of his 
information.21 
Second, since section 455 calls upon the judge to "disqualify 
himself," it is clear that the judge who is challenged should decide 
whether he is disqualified. This conclusion is supported by the ab-
sence of any procedure under the statute for having another judge 
rule on the disqualification request and the lack of any cases suggest-
ing that the self-disqualification procedure can be varied.22 
20. In re Milwaukee &: Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1927) (creditor in 
bankruptcy proceeding) and cases cited therein. 
21. Some districts allow a party to waive a disqualification and keep the judge on 
the case. In these districts, fairness dictates that the judge bring the relevant facts to the 
attention of the parties so that they can decide whether they wish to waive the dis• 
qualification. It appears from the cases that judges often follow this practice. See, e.g., 
Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Lampert v. Hollis Music, 
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). 
22. It can be argued that if a judge is partial he cannot make a fair decision on 
whether he should disqualify himself. Perhaps in recognition of this possibility, other 
systems for handling disqualification requests have evolved. For example, under 28 
U.S.C. § 144 (1970), relating to disqualification for bias or prejudice, the challenged 
judge rules only on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit alleging prejudice. He must ac-
cept the facts in the affidavit as true, even if he knows they are false. Berger v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). In some states a party is allowed to have a judge replaced 
without giving any reason. The party simply files a statement indicating that he does 
not think the judge would give him a fair trial. Upon filing of the statement, the judge 
cannot take further action in the case. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 83-901 (Supp. 
1971), 95-1709(a) (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-8 (1970). In some other states, another 
judge is brought in to rule on disqualification challenges. See, e.g., MlcH. CT. R. 405.2. 
Similarly, the Judicial Conference of the United States once endorsed a bill, S. 2478, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), that would have allowed section 144 motions to be heard 
by another judge. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., PROCEEDINGS 68-69 (1961). 
These alternatives, however, may raise problems of their own. Automatic disquali-
fication could result in abuse unless a limit were placed upon the number of judges 
January 1973] Comments 543 
Finally, once a judge is disqualified he remains so and cannot 
later withdraw the disqualification.23 Consequently, after disqualifi-
cation a judge is limited to performing ministerial acts such as 
making preliminary orders and taking the necessary action to trans-
fer the case to another judge.24 
However, while no notable problems have arisen with respect 
to the foregoing matters, some procedural issues have generated con-
troversy. These issues are discussed below. 
I. Can Disqualification of a Judge Be Waived? 
Under the prevailing interpretation of the pre-1948 statute, if a 
party, after learning of the facts that allegedly disqualified the judge, 
failed to request disqualification in a timely manner or knowingly 
consented to the judge's remaining on the case, he was deemed to 
have waived his right to raise the disqualification issue on motion 
for a new trial25 or on appeal.26 The 1948 revision of the disqualifica-
tion statute eliminated the requirement that a party raise the issue. 
Since the statute now reads "Any . . . judge . . . shall disqualify 
himself in any case in which [he falls within the statute's terms],"27 
it can be argued that disqualification is now unwaivable. However, 
most reported decisions have not considered the effect of the 1948 
language change and have continued to allow waiver.28 The only 
who could be rejected. This has been done in section 144, which limits a party to one 
disqualification request per case. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). A ruling by another judge 
inYolves some delay, as the new judge must take time to familiarize himself with the 
factual situation on which the request is based. Furthermore, some judges feel strongly 
that individual judges should retain the right to rule on disqualification motions. See, 
e.g., Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting). 
23. Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956). An exception to this rule 
may occur if the cause of the judge's disqualification is removed. See, e.g., In re Sime, 
22 Fed. Cas. 145 (No. 12,860) (C.C. Cal. 1872) (judge sold his claim against bankrupt 
and heard case since no other judge was obtainable). But see In re Honolulu Consol. 
Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917). 
Probably the most notable example of withdrawal of disqualification occurred when 
Chief Justice Stone did so in a case before the Supreme Court so that a quorum could 
be assembled. Frank, supra note 1, at 47. 
24. Stringer v. United States, 233 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Fox West Coast 
Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1936), affd., 88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
301 U.S. 710 (1937); Borough of Hasbrouck Heights v. Agrios, 10 F. Supp. 371 (D.N.J. 
1935). 
25. Crites v. Radtke, 29 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (consent); Borough of Has• 
brouck Heights v. Agrios, 10 F. Supp. 371 (D.N.J. 1935) (untimely motion). 
26. Kramer v. United States, 166 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1948) (untimely motion); Utz &: 
Dunn Co. v. Regulator Co., 213 F. 315 (8th Cir. 1914} (consent); Coltrane v. Templeton, 
106 F. 370 (4th Cir. 1901) (untimely motion). 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (emphasis added). 
28. Thomas v. United States, 363 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1966); Harris v. United States, 
338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964); Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962); Rami• 
rez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961); Neil v. United States, 205 F.2d 121 
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exception is the Sixth Circuit, which has most recently considered 
the waiver issue. That court held in United States v. Amerine29 that 
the statutory change eliminated the possibility of waiver: 
[W]hatever logical force the waiver argument might have otherwise, 
we believe it is completely negated by the fact that the statute 
originally required one of the parties to move for disqualification ... 
but in 1948 Congress amended the statute, removing this feature 
entirely .... 
As the statute now stands, the duty to disqualify is placed solely 
upon the District Judge. Burdensome as the duty may occasionally 
prove to be ... we think the statutory mandate must be observed.80 
While the Amerine decision may seem persuasive, the waiver 
issue is still open because the alteration of the disqualification stat-
ute was part of the 1948 general revision of title 28 of the United 
States Code, and there is virtually no legislative history giving any 
reason for the change.31 When a general revision amends statutory 
language, courts may not alter their form.er interpretation of the 
law unless they are satisfied that Congress intended the revision to 
change the effect of the law.82 This rule of statutory construction 
(9th Cir. 1953); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Lampert 
v. Hollis Music, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). 
In all the cases where the courts have recognized waiver the parties had knowledge 
of the facts that disqualified the judge and either failed to request disqualification in 
a timely manner or affirmatively indicated to the judge that they wanted him to remain 
on the case. The only possible exception is Ramirez, which is not clear about whether 
the defendant had prior knowledge of the matters that allegedly disqualified the judge. 
No court has indicated that it would hold a party to have waived a disqualification if 
the party did not know the facts that allegedly disqualified the judge. Since waiver has 
been characterized by the United States Supreme Court as an intentional abandonment 
of a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), it is doubt-
ful whether waiver would ever be possible under such circumstances. 
For an indication of current waiver practice in federal district courts, see the 
results of the author's questionnaire survey in Appendix infra. 
29. 411 F.2d 1130 (1969). 
30. 411 F.2d at 1134. The same conclusion was urged by Judge Brown, dissenting, in 
Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1962). The Adams majority recog-
nized that an "absolute technical disqualification" may be unwaivable, but did not 
indicate whether such circumstances could arise under section 455. 302 F.2d at 309. The 
position taken by the Amerine court and the Adams dissent is supported by William 
Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. International Curtiss Marine Turbine Co., 
228 U.S. 645 (1931), which held that rights under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970), 
prohibiting a judge from hearing an appeal of a case tried by him below, were not 
waivable. But see Lee v. United States, 91 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 745 
(1937); Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 689 
(1937). Both cases held that the challenged appellate judge was not disqualified under 
section 47, but in dicta they stated that waiver was possible. 
31. The Reviser's Notes do not indicate why the requirement that a party request 
disqualification was dropped. See H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A53 (1948). 
32. In Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957), a case arising 
out of the 1948 revision and involving another provision of title 28, the Supreme Court 
stated that " 'it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the 
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could support allowing waiver under section 455, and as a result the 
pre-1948 cases on the subject may still be good law. 
However, even if waiver is still possible under the statute, one 
important question remains: Should courts recognize waiver as a 
matter of policy? Since the goal of disqualification rules is to ensure 
fair trials by an impartial judge, it might be contended that the 
primacy of that goal should preclude a person from waiving his 
right to such a trial. While it may seem that disqualification should 
be waivable as are other important rights,33 in the disqualification 
context there are unique factors that must be considered. First, even 
if a disqualification would be in the best interests of his client, an 
attorney may hesitate to request disqualification in order not to 
alienate a judge before whom he may frequently appear.34 In such 
cases waiver operates as a penalty by turning the lawyer's hesitation 
into irrevocable loss of a right by his client.31' Second, the question 
laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.' " 353 
U.S. at 227, quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 188·99 (1912). The 
Court also quoted William W. Barron, the Chief Reviser of title 28, from his article, 
The Judicial Code: 1918 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 445-46 (1949): 
[N]o changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of language in revi-
sion unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed. 
Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a change of meaning 
but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler terms the original meaning of 
the statute revised. 
See 353 U.S. at 227 n.8. This position has most recently been affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 41 U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S., Dec. 5, 1972). In 
the case of section 455, some change in procedure was probably intended, since deleting 
the requirement that a party request disqualification is certainly more than a change in 
phraseology. It is not clear, however, that the change was motivated by anything more 
than a desire to let a judge act on his own motion, if he wished to do so, in disqualifica-
tion matters. See, e.g., Orfield, Recusation of Federal Judges, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 799, 
800 (1968). 
33. Waiver of constitutionally protected rights is usually allowed as long as proper 
procedures are followed. See, e.g., D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) 
(allowing waiver of notice and hearing before entry of a civil judgment); Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (waiver of right against search and seizure must be 
made or authorized by defendant); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 
269 (1942) (allowing waiver of right to jury trial and right to counsel); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
23(a) (allowing waiver of right to jury trial). 
34. John Frank concluded on the basis of extensive communication with lawyers 
that most of them regard any sort of waiver system as a "velvet blackjack." Frank, 
supra note 1, at 64. See also ABA CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3D, Commentary, 
referring to the possibility of lawyers feeling coerced into waiving a disqualification. 
35. Cf. Fro. R. Evm. 605, Advisory Committee's Note, in 93 S. Ct. No. 5, Jan. I, 
1973 (effective July 1, 1973). In connection with rule 605, providing that a presiding 
judge may not testify in a trial as a witness, the advisory committee noted that the at-
torney is not required to object in order to preserve the point for appeal, since he would 
be placed in the untenable position of having to choose between allowing the admission 
of excludable evidence or making an objection that the judge might consider an attack 
on his integrity. 
One device appellate courts could use to prevent harm to a party from his lawyer's 
timidity is a requirement that the party have knowledge of the facts giving rise to a 
possible disqualification claim. See Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 
1962) (Brown, J., dissenting). It would, of course, be difficult to ascertain whether a party 
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of disqualification may have implications for interests beyond those 
of the parties, for it may involve the integrity of the judicial system. 
Thus, it is arguable that disqualification should not be raised solely 
at the discretion of the parties. The Michigan supreme court once 
noted: 
[T]he Court ought not to be astute to discover refined and subtle 
distinctions to save a case from the operation of the maxim ["No man 
can be a judge in his own cause"] when the principle it embodies 
bespeaks the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of 
the litigants are not the only objects of the rule. A sound public 
policy, which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by 
law from discredit, imperiously demands its observance.36 
On the other hand, elimination of waiver offers potential for 
abuse. If a party is interested only in delay or wants to determine 
first whether a judge's decision will be favorable to him, he may not 
raise the disqualification issue until after trial.37 This could, of 
course, work considerable hardship on the opposing party and would 
also cause inefficiency in the administration of justice. Furthermore, 
it may be inappropriate to force a judge to disqualify himself when 
he and the parties have manifested agreement that he should hear 
the case. 
In spite of these competing arguments over the desirability of 
waiver, it appears that the pressure that may be perceived by an 
attorney who must maintain a continuing relationship with the 
judge is the paramount factor to be considered. This conclusion 
would support an elimination or tight restriction of the use of 
waiver. It is therefore to be hoped that other circuits will follow the 
lead of the Sixth Circuit in refusing to impose or accept waivers. 
While the Code of Judicial Conduct would allow express waivers in 
cases involving financial interest or relationship,38 the possibility of 
had such knowledge unless he were required affirmatively to waive the disqualification 
claim. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3D, would require such action by a party 
for effective waiver. See note 19 supra. Thus far, no court has held that there was no 
waiver on the ground that the party did not personally waive disqualification. 
36. Stock.well v. Township Bd., 22 Mich. 341, 350 (1871). 
37. See Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962). Opportunities for 
this type of abuse may be rare, since in order to avoid the possibility of a new trial 
both the judge and opposing lawyer would want to make sure at the outset that the 
judge was qualified to hear the case. Flagrant abuse, if it did occur, could probably be 
controlled by other means, such as sanctions against the offending attorney. Cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11. See also text accompanying notes 141-43 infra. 
38. ABA CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3D &: Commentary. The Code allows 
waiver in these circumstances only under procedures designed to minimize the possibil-
ity of judicial coercion. The Reporter's Notes indicate that the drafters of the Code 
felt that the prescribed procedures-requiring both the lawyers and parties to sign a 
waiver outside of the judge's presence--wonld eliminate any coercion problems and at 
the same time reduce the chance of hardship caused by delay in obtaining another 
judge. See ABA Special Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Reporter's Notes, 
51-55, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter ABA Reporter's Notes]. 
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the lawyer feeling judicial coercion suggests that waiver should not 
be permitted at all.39 
2. Timing and Mode of Appeal in Disqualification 
Cases: Is Mandamus Available? 
When the issue of possible disqualification arises at trial, a 
judge's refusal to disqualify himself may not be reviewed by inter-
locutory appeal.40 Normally, a claim that a judge should have dis-
qualified himself is raised on appeal after entry of final judgment.41 
However, there is a wide spectrum of opinion among the various 
courts of appeals over whether a party can use a petition for a writ 
of mandamus as a vehicle for obtaining prejudgment appellate re-
view of a judge's disqualification decision.42 Some circuits have 
39. See Frank, supra note I, at 63-64. 
A special situation may arise in the Supreme Court with respect to waiver. If a 
justice is not asked to disqualify himself until after the decision is announced and if 
the case is close, a justice's disqualification decision may be the difference between, for 
example, a five-to-four reversal of a lower court's decision and a four-to-four affirmance. 
It is questionable whether a justice should be put into a position in which he is vir-
tually asked to decide the case himself. Thus, in the Supreme Court there would be 
reason for holding that a party had waived the disqualification if he did not request it 
before the decision was announced. 
40. The appellate jurisdiction of United States Courts of Appeals is limited to ap-
peals from final judgments and from certain interlocutory decisions involving injunc-
tions, receiverships, and under some circumstances admiralty and patent disputes. The 
courts of appeals also have the discretion to decide questions of law certified to them by 
a district judge. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1970). For cases applying these statutes to 
disqualification, see Collier v. Picard, 237 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1956); Baltuff v. United 
States, 35 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1929); McColgan v. Lineker, 289 F. 253 (9th Cir. 1923); 
In re Wingert, 22 F. Supp. 484 (D. Md. 1938). Collier and McColgan apparently con-
cerned the bias and prejudice statute, now 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). Because of the ab-
breviated opinions, it is not clear that Wingert and Baltuff arose under what is now 
section 455; but in each case the court intimated that the judge was a witness, which 
is one of the grounds for disqualification under section 455. In all of these cases inter-
locutory appeals of denials of motions for disqualification were not allowed. 
41. If the appellate court finds the judge was disqualified, the judgment in the case 
is reversed and the case is remanded, presumably for retrial before another judge. See, 
e.g., United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969). 
42. This issue is more often discussed in cases involving section 144, However, since 
essentially the same issues are involved in section 455 cases, both types of cases will be 
cited in discussing the general problem of whether mandamus is an appropriate method 
for reviewing a judge's decision not to disqualify himself. The similarity of the issues 
is evidenced by the fact that the Third Circuit, explaining the decision of a section 455 
case that appeared inconsistent with the result in an earlier section 144 case, did not 
attempt to distinguish the cases on the basis that different statutes were involved. 
Compare Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965), with Green v. Murphy, 259 
F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958). 
Presently eight circuits have been willing to entertain requests for writs of manda-
mus in disqualification cases. Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1945); In re Union 
Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Wolfson v. Pal-
mieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968); General Tire 8: Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F.2d 87 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Henry v. Spear, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913); 
Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972); Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 
(9th Cir. 1955); United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Three circuits have indicated that they do not think mandamus is appropriate in dis-
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refused even to consider such petitions in disqualification cases, 
while the other circuits will entertain applications for the writ upon 
a showing of "exceptional circumstances."43 Those circuits that re-
fuse to consider the writ defend their position with three basic 
arguments. First, they characterize a judge's decision not to disqual-
ify himself as a discretionary act and note that mandamus is only 
proper to order a judge to perform ministerial, not discretionary, 
actions.44 Second, they argue that the congressional policy against 
piecemeal appeals overcomes any claim that early review would be 
desirable in order to prevent unnecessary expense and hardship from 
befalling litigants.45 Finally, they contend that mandamus is not 
appropriate because the remedy of appeal after final judgment is 
adequate.46 The essential point that these courts stress is the limited 
and exceptional nature of the mandamus remedy.47 
qualification cases. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958); Albert v. United States 
District Court, 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961); Korer v. 
Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1954). 
It should be mentioned that no court has refused to consider a request for a writ of 
mandamus in a section 455 case. See United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 
997 (10th Cir. 1971); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968) (primarily con-
cerned with section 144); General Tire 8e Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965); In re 
Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917). This is explained by the fact that 
no section 455 cases have arisen in circuits that refuse to consider writs in section 144 
cases except for Rapp v. Van Dusen. In that case, the Third Circuit did not abandon 
or modify its usual position against considering requests for mandamus in disqualifica-
tion cases. It issued a writ of mandamus ouly on the basis of two unusual facts-first, 
the case was about to be transferred out of the circuit, and mandamus was the only 
opportunity for review of the transferring judge's refusal to disqualify himself; second, 
the alleged disqualification arose from circumstances created by a previous Third Cir-
cuit ruling in the case, and thus the court felt an obligation to grant mandamus under 
its general supervisory powers. 350 F.2d at 810. 
43. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958), is an example of the various posi-
tions that can be taken by a court. The Third Circuit sitting en bane split three ways 
-the majority of four refused to consider the application for the writ, two concurring 
judges considered the application and urged its rejection, while the dissenting judge 
considered the request and voted to issue the writ. 
44. It is generally accepted that mandamus is a writ to be used for ordering a public 
official (including a judge) to perform a ministerial duty he owes the petitioner. Albert 
v. United States District Court, 283 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 
(1961). See also Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 593 (3d Cir. 1958); Korer v. Hoffman, 
212 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1954). 
45. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1958); Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 
211, 215 (7th Cir. 1954). 
46. Typically mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, is available only when no ade-
quate remedy exists at law. Albert v. United States District Court, 283 F.2d 61, 62 (6th 
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 
1958); Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1954). 
47. The Seventh Circuit recently noted that this is a minority view in disqualifica-
tion cases, but still adhered to it. Nevertheless, the court did look at the mandamus 
petition and determined that no exceptional circumstances were present. Action Realty 
Co. v. Will, 427 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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The circuits that are willing to entertain petitions for the writ 
reject this restrictive view. They argue that in exceptional circum-
stances, they should consider an application for the writ in the inter-
ests of justice.48 An example of exceptional circumstances is the 
situation in which the judge in a disbarment proceeding has mani-
fested such a degree of bias against the challenged attorney that the 
judge's continued involvement in the case would result in "the 
likely irreparable unjust smearing of [the lawyer's] reputation dur-
ing the course of the proceeding below and the months of appellate 
procedure . . . ."49 Another example is a case in which delaying 
appeal of a disqualification decision until after final judgment would 
entail the risk of having to retry a very complex antitrust case.50 In 
general, however, an "exceptional circumstances" test may not be 
particularly difficult to meet in disqualification cases since such 
cases, by their nature, potentially involve exceptional circumstances. 
As Judge Hastie of the Third Circuit noted in his concurring opin-
ion in Green v. Murphy:111 
[A] trial is not likely to proceed in a very satisfactory way if an 
unsettled claim of judicial bias is an ever present source of tension 
and irritation. Only a final ruling on the matter by a disinterested 
higher court before trial can dispel this unwholesome aura .... Such 
considerations far outweigh the objections to piecemeal appeals 
which ordinarily militate against deciding on mandamus an issue 
which can be reviewed after trial.52 
Such factors as these are believed by the circuits that consider re-
quests for mandamus in disqualification cases to establish the inade-
quacy of review by appeal after final judgment.53 Generally speak-
48. Judge Kalodner presented an extensive discussion of the existence of jurisdiction 
in mandamus cases in bis dissenting opinion in Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 597-605 
(3d Cir. 1958). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 108 (1967) (Black, J., con-
curring-): In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
927 (1961). 
49. Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1955). Although Gladstein 
arose under the bias and prejudice statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970), its result on the man-
damus issue could be applied in section 455 cases. See note 42 supra. 
In Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965), the Third Circuit, which nor-
mally refuses to consider mandamus in disqualification cases, entertained a petition for 
the writ on the basis of the unique circumstances in that case. See note 42 supra. 
50. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972). But see In re Union Leader 
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961), in which the court 
noted that if the possibility of retrial after terminal appeal of a judge's refusal to dis-
qualify were deemed an exceptional circumstance, a mandamus petition would be an 
appropriate mode of review for every interlocutory disqualification decision. 
51. 259 F.2d 591 (1958). 
52. 259 F.2d at 595. See also Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); 
In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961), 
in which Judge Aldrich noted that maintaining public confidence in the courts may 
require the earliest possible disposal of disqualification challenges. 
53. As a practical matter, requests for mandamus involve only minor delay, because 
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ing, once a court decides to com.ider an application for a writ of 
mandamus, it will apply the same tests as it would on final appeal to 
determine whether there is in fact a disqualification.54 
B. Statutory Interpretation of Section 455 
A request for disqualification requires that the judge ( or appel-
late court) determine whether the judge falls within one of the 
statute's four classifications--of counsel, substantial interest, mate-
rial witness, and relation to or connection with a party or his attor-
ney. Such a determination necessarily involves interpreting the 
statute in light of the facts in the individual case. This section will 
examine the activities that have been held to disqualify a judge 
under section 455. 
Throughout most of the statute's history the phrase "of counsel" 
has been construed literally. Unless the judge was an attorney for 
one of the parties in connection with the specific case before him, he 
would not be regarded as having been "of counsel."55 A broader 
standard has been applied to United States attorneys who have been 
appointed to district judgeships. Since United States attorneys are 
required by law to prosecute all criminal offenses against the United 
States,56 courts have held them "of counsel" in all federal prosecu-
they have priority over ordinary civil cases on the appellate docket. FED. R. APP. P. 2l(b). 
Requests for mandamus do, however, interrupt the usual flow of cases in the appellate 
court. 
Some states allow review by petition for writ of mandamus as a matter of course in 
disqualification cases. See, e.g., NAACP v. State, 274 Ala. 544, 547-48, 150 S.2d 677, 680· 
81 (1963). 
The courts that consider petitions for mandamus appear to ignore the argument that 
disqualification is not a ministerial act, as is normally required. See note 44 supra and 
accompanying text. It could be argued that because section 455 states that a judge shall 
disqualify himself in cases in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, 
or is a material witness, disqualification in such circumstances is mandatory rather than 
discretionary. However, since the statute explicitly states that disqualification on the 
grounds of relation or connection to a party or his attorney is to be based on the judge's 
opinion, disqualification in such instances is dearly discretionary. 
54. See Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972); United Family Life Ins. Co. 
v. Barrow, 452 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1971); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 {2d Cir. 1968): 
General Tire&: Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 
(1966); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 
F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); In re Union Leader Corp., 
292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961): United States v. Ritter, 273 
F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1959); Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955); In re 
Lisman, 89 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1937); Minnesota&: Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 
F.2d 545 {8th Cir. 1934); Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913): United States v. 
Gross, 298 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D. Iowa 1968). 
55. Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494 (1895); Rose v. United States, 295 F. 687 (4th Cir. 1924); 
In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 (8th Cir. 1902); Duncan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 223 F. 
446 (S.D. Ga. 1915); The Richmond, 9 F. 863 (C.C.E.D. La. 1881) (reviewing earlier 
decisions). 
56. 28 u.s.c. § 547 (1970). 
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tions that were commenced in their districts during their tenures as 
United States attorneys. As a consequence they have not been eligi-
ble to sit on trials of those cases even if the case was handled entirely 
by one of their assistants.57 
While it is clear that a judge is "of counsel" when he participated 
formally in a case by signing papers or by appearing in court, there 
is recent support for the view that an informal advisor can also be 
"of counsel." The Code of Judicial Conduct calls for disqualification 
if a judge served as a "lawyer in the matter in controversy."58 This 
wording seems to include a legal advisor, even one who did not 
appear in court or on the briefs. A memorandum prepared for 
Justice White by the Department of Justice also reaches this con-
clusion.150 Treating a legal advisor as "of counsel" is sensible because 
a judge who has given legal advice to a party regarding a specific 
case may be as likely to be partial as an attorney who has formally 
represented that party in court. 60 
57. United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Vasilick, 
160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947); United States v. Maher, 88 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Me. 1950). 
See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL 
JUDGE 35 (tentative draft 1972). 
In United States v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1970), however, the court was 
unwilling to extend this interpretation to nonprosecutorial functions of United States 
attorneys and refused to hold a judge disqualified when a defendant had been the sub-
ject of a federal investigation while the judge was United States attorney. The court felt 
that his general supervisory responsibility for investigations was not enough to call for 
disqualification, and that the crucial factor, at least for purposes of the "of counsel" 
provision, was the time when formal prosecution began. The court remanded for further 
findings of fact on this issue and for a determination of whether other possible grounds 
for disqualification under section 455 could have arisen from the judge's involvement. 
But see United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972). The defendant in Ryan 
had been a witness in an earlier related trial, which had taken place when the judge 
was United States attorney. The appellate court did not order disqualification, but 
stated that for the sake of appearance the court assumed that the judge would not 
participate in any further proceedings in the case. An argument similar to that accepted 
in Ryan was rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737 (5th 
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958). 
58. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C(l)(b), set out in note 19 supra. 
59. [I]t seems clear that a government attorney is "of counsel" within the meaning 
of [section] 455 with respect to any case in which he signs a pleading or brief, even 
if this was merely a formal act, and probably should be regarded as "of counsel'' 
if he actively participated in any case even though he did not sign a pleading or 
brief. 
Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices 
Because of a Prior Participation in a Case as a Government Attorney or Official, April 
9, 1962, at 3 (memorandum prepared for Justice White), on file with the Michigan Law 
Review [hereinafter White Memorandum]. Justice Rehnquist has endorsed the memo-
randum's interpretation of the "of counsel" provision. Laird v. Tatum, 41 U.SL.W. 
3208, 3209 (U.S., Oct. IO, 1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). See also I.C.J. STAT. 
art. 17, para. 2, providing that no member of the International Court of Justice may 
participate in any case in which he has taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for 
one of the parties. 
60. At a minimum, a judge who has served as a legal advisor to one of the parties 
may be unable to maintain an appearance of impartiality. For the argument that ap-
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There is one other interpretative problem that often arises in 
determining whether a judge was "of counsel." Since the statute 
provides that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any case in which 
he has . . . been of counsel,"61 it is sometimes necessary to decide 
what constitutes a "case." There are two problems in this regard. 
First, when does a case begin for purposes of the statute? The Sixth 
Circuit has held that a case does not begin until prosecution com-
mences-that is, until an indictment is retumed.62 The second 
problem, which is more complex, is whether two separate proceed-
ings should be considered as one case. In this connection, the Fifth 
Circuit has held that a judge, who while United States attorney had 
prosecuted a "liquor violation," was not of counsel in a perjury 
prosecution based on the "liquor violation" trial because the per-
jury action was commenced after he had become a judge.63 It would 
seem to be the better view that the word "case" refers to any group 
of suits arising out of the same factual setting, especially when the 
same parties are involved.64 If a judge presides at a second suit in-
volving the same factual setting as an earlier suit in which he partici-
pated as an attorney or prosecutor, his preconceptions of the facts 
based on his experience in the earlier suit may preclude him from 
being, or appearing to be, impartial.65 In such a situation, a judge 
pearance should be a factor in a judge's disqualification decision, see notes 113-20 infra 
and accompanying text. 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (emphasis added). 
62. United States v. Wilson, 426 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1970). Cf. Rose v. United States, 
295 F. 687 (4th Cir. 1924). 
63. Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962). 
64. This result was strongly urged by Judge Brown, who filed a vigorous dissent in 
Adams focusing on the virtual identity of the issues involved in the two proceedings. 
302 F.2d at 310-14. The Fifth Circuit had earlier indicated that identical fact situations 
would be sufficient to require disqualification. See Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 
737 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958). Support for the Adams majority 
position can be found in Rose v. United States, 295 F. 687 (4th Cir. 1924), finding that a 
judge was not disqualified even though the indictment on which the defendant was 
tried contained several offenses identical to those charged in an earlier indictment pre-
pared while the judge was United States attorney. The Court held that the two indict-
ments did not constitute a single case. However, some support for the Adams dissent 
exists in Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153 (1899), in which the Court, construing what 
is now 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970) (disqualification of appellate judge from hearing appeal 
from trial he conducted), rejected a narrow interpretation of the statute and held that 
a judge was disqualified if he had participated at any stage of the lower court pro-
ceedings, even if he had not ruled on the precise question presented on appeal. 
65. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text. 
One other aspect of the "case" question deserves mention. When one party in a 
lawsuit applies to a court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, the action is nominally 
against the district judge, although the relief requested will normally be adverse to 
the interests of the opposing party in the case. Occasionally, the judge's responsive 
pleading is prepared by that opposing party, and it is likely that the attorneys will 
consult with the judge on whose behalf the answer is being filed. The party that 
applied for mandamus may therefore claim that the judge is disqualified because his 
consultation with opposing counsel has made him "of counsel" in the case. This argu-
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should disqualify himself on the ground that he was of counsel in 
the case before him. 
The second ground for disqualification is that the judge has a 
"substantial interest" in a case. Interest was the basic ground for dis-
qualification at common law,66 and it has been adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in cases challenging state court pro-
ceedings under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.61 
Courts have typically equated substantial interest with financial 
interest.68 An example of such an interest is that of a judge who has 
a financial stake in a similar case that has not yet been tried. 69 How-
ment was basically accepted in Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965). The 
court ordered the trial judge not to sit in subsequent phases of the litigation because 
of his use of counsel for defendants to prepare his response to the mandamus petition 
submitted by plaintiffs. The court stated that it was basing its decision on its super-
visory powers over the district courts rather than on section 455, 350 F.2d at 810, 814, 
but Judge Kalodner, concurring, 350 F.2d at 814-15, thought section 455 the proper 
ground. The argument was rejected in General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 
F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966). To the extent that a judge's reliance 
on a party's counsel is a problem, it can be easily solved by a court rule requiring that 
the opposing party in interest, instead of the judge, respond to a request for mandamus. 
This solution was adopted in both Rapp v. Van Dusen and General Tire b Rubber. 
Accord, In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 
(1961). 
A somewhat analogous situation arose in the Ninth Circuit when a defendant, in 
an attempt to cause the judge's disqualification for interest or connection with the 
opposing party, sued jointly both his opponents and the judge in a counterclaim. The 
court rejected the disqualification claim, although it suggested that the judge could 
disqualify himself if he wished to be rid of the case. Ely Valley Mines, Inc. v. Lee, 385 
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1967). However, it has been held that when a judge has been sued 
in a civil action, it is a ground for disqualification if his lawyer in the civil action ap-
pears before him as an attorney in another unrelated case. Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 
354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). 
66. See text accompanying note 8 supra. Section 455 formerly required disqualifi-
cation if a judge was in "any ways, concerned in interest." See note 9 supra. In 1948 
this was changed to "substantial interest." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), set out in text ac-
companying note 12 supra. As was the case with the other changes in the statute made 
at that time, there is no legislative history explaining the reason for the revision. Thus, 
courts can conclude that no change in substantive law was intended. See text accom-
panying notes 31-32 supra. Since prior to 1948 this section of the statute usually was 
construed to deal with financial interest, see note 68 infra, perhaps the change was in-
tended to make it clear that a judge can hear a case if he has only a minor stockholding 
in a party. See Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3, 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). But see 
note 72 infra and accompanying text. 
67. "[N]o man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases 
where he has an interest in the outcome." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
Cf. text accompanying note 7 supra. 
68. United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 924 
(1968); United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 
(1966); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1371, 1385 (S.D. 
Tex. 1969), affd., 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); Frank, supra 
note 1, at 53-54. 
69. In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 848 (9th Cir. 1917); Middletown Natl. 
Bank v. Toledo, A.A. & N.M.R.R., 105 F. 547 (C,C.S.D.N.Y. 1900), 
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ever, the substantial interest provision does not extend so far as to 
disqualify a judge who owns stock in a bank from sitting at the trial 
of a defendant accused of robbing that bank.70 Generally a minor 
stockholding in a party has not been regarded as grounds for dis-
qualification,71 but in recent years the practice of a judge hearing a 
case in which he has any financial interest, even an infinitesimal 
stockholding, has been the subject of considerable criticism.72 More-
over, the Code of Judicial Conduct calls for the disqualification of a 
judge who has a "legal or equitable interest, however small" in a 
party.w 
70. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970). 
See also Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972) (judges of Tenth 
Circuit not disqualified in appeal from actions they had taken as members of the Judi, 
cial Conference of the Tenth Circuit); Long v. Stites, 63 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
290 U.S. 640 (1933) (judge not disqualified in suit involving trust owning stock in bank 
where he was depositor); Epstein v. United States, 196 F. 354 (7th Cir. 1912) (judge 
not disqualified in a trial resulting from his having previously directed the prosecutor 
to find and prosecute persons who had looted an estate); United States v. Deardorff, 
343 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (judge not disqualified in a case involving a company 
to whom she had voted to give a franchise while President of the Borough of Man-
hattan, where that franchise was not involved in the case). 
71. E.g., Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf. United 
States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970). 
72. This trend was highlighted by the criticism directed at Judge Haynsworth, dur-
ing the debate on his nomination to the Supreme Court, for hearing cases despite his 
indirect financial interest in a party. See Frank, supra note 1, at 51-60; Frank, 18 AM.. 
J. CoMP. L. '744, supra note 3, at '753-61. 
One result of this controversy was evidenced by events in the Fifth Circuit. In the 
Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 
(1970), two members of the original three-judge panel held stock, individually or as 
trustees, in several of the forty-five corporate parties. The judges notified counsel of 
these holdings and gave them a fixed time to request disqualification. After mounting 
pressure, both judges disqualified themselves without request before the deadline they 
had established. See Holloman, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis, and Com-
ment, 35 LAW&: CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 139 (1970). 
Another result was a resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States re-
quiring federal judges to file annually with the Conference a statement of investments 
and income. The report is to be made public upon filing. JUDICIAL CoNF. OF THE U.S., 
PROCEEDINGS 42-43 (1969). The report form, set out in JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., 
PROCEEDINGS 7-9 (1970), requires a statement of whether the judge has participated in 
any case in which he or a member of his immediate family had a financial interest in 
one of the named parties. If he has, the judge must detail the nature and amount of 
the interest, the amount at issue in the case, and the reasons why he deemed it proper 
to participate. 
A third result was the introduction of several bills in Congress to broaden the dis-
qualification laws. See, e.g., S. 3055, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. 4 (1968); S. 4201, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For a discussion of these and other proposals, see Frank, supra 
note I; Holloman, supra. Neither of these bills has been enacted into law. 
73. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C(3)(c), set out in note 19 supra. The 
matter of financial interest is covered in detail by the Code. The Canons of Judicial 
Ethics did not deal specifically with this question, but they were interpreted to require 
disqualification if a judge owned stock in a party. ABA OPINIONS, supra note 16, No. 
170. 
A judge is not held to have a disqualifying financial interest because of his status 
as a taxpayer. Wade v. Travis County, 72 F. 985 (W.D. Tex. 1896), afjd., 81 F. 742 (5th 
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A significant question in the area of "substantial interest" is 
whether a judge who was connected with a case as a lawyer, prose-
cutor, or advisor should be deemed to have a "substantial interest" 
in the outcome of the case even if his connection with the case would 
technically not be sufficient to categorize the judge as "of counsel." 
The crux of the issue is whether a lawyer who took part in the for-
mulation or advocacy of a party's legal arguments without formally 
representing the party can be, or appear to be, impartial when he 
later weighs these arguments as a judge.74 
Justice Frankfurter once pointed out that we know very little 
about the psychology of decision-making, but that we do know 
enough to be fairly certain that unconscious factors can be critical 
in arriving at a decision.75 In Adams v. United States,16 Judge Brown 
of the Fifth Circuit wrote in dissent: 
It is probably true that lawyers, from discipline and training, 
have an intellectual capacity to view objectively that which they 
formerly maintained, personally or vicariously, as partisans. But our 
system does not work that way. Our system frees the person of such 
a new-made umpire of that awful responsibility. Doing so, it insures 
that the mind of the Judge, as the mind of the juror, has not been 
affected or even possibly influenced by former positions taken con-
cerning the very transaction and issue upon which he must now 
pass.77 
Similarly, the Adams majority, though it found no basis for dis-
qualification on the facts of the case, indicated that the court would 
Cir. 1897), revd. on other grounds, 174 U.S. 499 (1899). Cf. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 
(1920), in which the Court held unconstitutional under article III, section l an income 
tax on federal judges' salaries. The Court did not relish making the decision: 
Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, 
thus broadly stated, we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us; and this al-
though each member has been paying the tax in respect of his salary voluntarily 
and in regular course. But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined 
or renounced. 
253 U.S. at 247. 
74. See Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962): 
[B]ecause this case was not commenced until months after [the judge] had resigned 
as United States Attorney ••. it is clear, we think, that the judge was not dis-
qualified on the ground of having "been of counsel in" the case which he was then 
trying. 
This, of course, does not dispose of the case, for the trial judge is still subject 
to disqualification if he had "a substantial interest" in the case which he was then 
trying. Although it is doubtless true that the term "substantial interest" normally 
refers to a pecuniary or beneficial interest of some kind, we construe the language 
broadly enough to comprehend the interest that any lawyer has in pushing his 
case to a successful conclusion. 
75. "mudges are also human, and we know better than did our forebears how pow-
erful is the pull of the unconscious and how treacherous the rational process." Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (concurring opinion). 
76. 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962). 
77. 302 F.2d at 313 (emphasis added). 
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interpret the substantial interest clause of section 455 as encompass-
ing "the interest that any lawyer has in pushing his case to a success-
ful conclusion."78 The United States Supreme Court reached an 
analogous conclusion in In re Murchison,19 a due process case involv-
ing a Michigan circuit court judge who attempted to try a person for 
a criminal contempt allegedly committed during a one-man grand 
jury proceeding conducted by the same judge. Speaking for the 
Court, Justice Black wrote: 
A single "judge-grand jury" is even more a part of the accusatory 
process than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that 
process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly 
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused. While 
he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly 
not be said that he would have none of that zeal.80 
The language in these cases suggests that a judge who has actively 
participated in a case by advising one of the parties or by acting as 
an advocate for that party is probably more likely to be swayed by 
arguments that he helped to devise or expound than by other argu-
ments. 81 This psychological attachment of a judge to his own ar-
guments may be viewed as a "substantial interest" requiring his 
disqualification. 82 
Another possible form of substantial interest that could arguably 
78. 302 F.2d at 310. 
79. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
80. 349 U.S. at 137. The Court was also concerned about the judge's reliance on 
his recollection of facts that did not appear in the record and the problem that "[t]here 
were no public witnesses upon whom petitioners could call to give disinterested testi-
mony concerning what took place in the secret chambers of the judge." 349 U.S. at 138. 
81. A judge may be aware of the possibility of his acting partially and attempt to 
bend over backwards to avoid doing so. This, of course, simply changes the direction 
of the partiality and would be unfair to the side the judge had advised. For an ex-
ample of a party who felt that the judge might behave in this manner, see Green v. 
Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 593 (3d Cir. 1958). 
82. This interest should be distinguished from the situation where the judge has 
previously ruled on a point of law or has presided at a different trial involving one of 
the parties. These are not advocate roles because the judge's opinion is the result of 
deliberation, not an attempt to influence deliberation. Judges are therefore not barred 
from hearing cases because the same parties have previously appeared before them or 
because they have ruled or written on similar legal questions. Goodpasture v. TVA, 
434 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1970); Smith v. United States, 360 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966); 
Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1956). Similarly, the fact that a judge 
has expressed a general feeling toward a governmental policy does not disqualify him 
from sitting in cases where that policy is only a tangential issue. In Lawton v. Tarr, 
327 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.C. 1971), a judge who was publicly opposed to the Vietnam 
War declined to disqualify himself in a selective service case. The judge felt he could 
properly apply the relevant statutes and stressed that the government had never before 
objected to his presiding over such trials. The judge's decision in Lawton finds support 
in the practice of Supreme Court justices who have not disqualified themselves in 
cases involving legislation that they had helped to draft or on which they had publicly 
expressed an opinion. See Laird v. Tatum, 41 U.S.L.W. 3208, 3209-10 (U.S., Oct, 10, 
1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.); Frank, supra note I, at 50, 
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lead to disqualification is that arising when a judge has some prior 
knowledge of disputed facts in a case. In such a situation the judge's 
recollections may handicap a party in attempting to establish its 
version of the facts. 83 The appropriateness of this argument has been 
recognized by the Code of Judicial Conduct. 84 The committee that 
drafted the Code felt that a judge could not be, or at least could not 
appear to be, impartial if he had such knowledge.85 While no cases 
have been decided on this ground, the argument has been approved 
by the Fifth Circuit.86 
There are relatively few cases involving the "material witness" 
provision of section 455.87 There is, however, general agreement that 
the provision does not apply unless one of the parties actually calls 
83. In addition, our adversary system presupposes that a neutral umpire will decide 
the case on the basis of evidence presented to it by the parties. If that decision maker 
has prior knowledge of the facts of a case, the decision may be based on something not 
formally presented to the court and thus not on the record for appeal. As Chief Justice 
Marshall stated in United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833): "The loose-
ness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings, would prove fatal to the 
great principles of justice, if the judge might notice and act upon facts not brought 
regularly into the cause." 
84. ABA CoDE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr, Canon 3C(l)(a), set out in note 19 supra. 
85. ABA Reporter's Notes, supra note 38, at 36. The rules of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission also recognize this: "[A commissioner] should disqualify himself in 
the event he obtained knowledge prior to becoming a member of the facts at issue 
before him in a quasi-judicial proceeding •••• " 17 C.F.R. § 200.60 (1972). 
86. "A prior knowledge of the facts or a prior interest in an issue arising out of 
them may be a ground for disqualification." Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737, 
741 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919 (1958). 
Section 455 does not apply to regulatory commissions, but courts have applied simi-
lar standards to them under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. American 
Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (commissioner who had been chief 
counsel to Senate subcommittee investigating drug industry held disqualified in Com-
mission proceeding involving the facts and parties that were subject to investigation); 
Amos Treat&: Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (commissioner who had worked 
on case while staff member held disqualified from participating in decision); Trans 
World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (member of CAB who had signed 
brief in case disqualified from participating in decision). See also SEC v. R. A. Holman 
&: Co., 323 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963). But see Pangburn v. 
CAB, 3Il F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962). 
87. This provision has frequently been raised by motions to vacate sentence under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). In these cases, courts have ruled that Congress intended to 
allow the trial judge to pass on such motions and have rejected the claim that the 
judge is a material witness. United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 53-54 (4th Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1965); Mirra v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 570, 582-83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), afjd., 379 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967). But see 
Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967), afjd., 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (decision 
that trial judge should not hear motion based on appellate court's general supervisory 
powers over district courts). See also Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 
1972); Lucerno v. United States, 425 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. United 
States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962). 
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a trial judge who hears a motion to vacate sen-
tence cannot base his decision on hearsay information, such as a presentence report, 
unless he discloses the information to the defendant. Battaglia v. United States, 390 
F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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the judge as a witness.88 While it is not clear what is meant by 
"material witness," at the least it probably means that the judge is 
not disqualified unless his testimony would be admissible.89 In addi-
tion, there may be a requirement that it be necessary for the judge 
to testify; in other words, if another witness could supply the same 
evidence, the judge would not be a material witness.00 The Code of 
Judicial Conduct would expand the current statutory provisions to 
require disqualification when a member of a judge's family or a 
former law partner is a material witness. 91 
Disqualification under section 455 can also occur when a judge 
is "so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to 
render it improper, in [the judge's] opinion, for him to sit on the trial, 
appeal, or other proceeding therein."92 Cases arising under this 
clause generally involve a familial relationship between the judge 
and a party or his attorney. For example, in one case a judge dis-
qualified himself because he was related within the fourth degree of 
consanguinity to a person who had an interest in the case.98 In an-
other case, however, a judge did not disqualify himself although he 
belonged to the same international legal society as one defendant, 
and the appellate court sustained his decision to sit.04 Other cases 
have upheld decisions of a district judge not to disqualify himself 
when he had sold his stock in one party twenty-five years prior to the 
trial95 and when he had worked as a lawyer for one party earlier in 
his legal career.96 Since the Code of Judicial Conduct lays down spe-
88. United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); 
United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964). A 
judge cannot, however, attempt to testify indirectly by asking questions of another wit-
ness. Terrell v. United States, 6 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1925). 
89. See Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 
615 (1935); United States v. Gilboy, 162 F. Supp. 384, 400-01 (M.D. Pa. 1958). 
90. See Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 
615 (1935). 
91. ABA CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 3C(l)(b), 3C(l)(d)(iv), set out in note 
19supra. 
92. 28 u.s.c. § 455 (1970). 
93. In re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120 F. 1010 (S.D. Ga. 1903). But see In re Fox West 
Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1936), affd., 88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937). In Fox, the judge declined to disqualify himself, in part 
because his relationship was to someone not technically a party but merely a recent 
officer of the corporate party. This was probably an overly strict reading of the word 
"party" in the statute. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNnucr, Canon 3C(l)(d)(i), set out in 
note 19 supra, includes such relationships among the grounds for disqualification. 
94. Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853 (1963). 
95. United States Fidelity &: Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md.), afjd., 
334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964). 
96. Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
359 U.S. 992 (1959). 
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cific guidelines for these situations,97 it is hoped that in the future 
judges will follow these standards in the interest of uniformity.98 
The final point to be noted in interpreting the statute's language 
is that the judge's discretion varies depending on the nature of the 
alleged disqualification. If the disqualification request is based on 
his relation to or connection with a party, the judge has discretion in 
determining whether he should disqualify himself because the stat-
ute expressly allows him to decide whether "in his opinion" it is 
"improper ... for him to sit on the trial."99 As a result, appellate 
courts give considerable deference to the trial judge's decision so 
long as it is not arbitrary or capricious.100 However, if the alleged 
disqualification is based on one of the first three statutory grounds-
of counsel, substantial interest, or material witness-the judge's dis-
cretion is more limited in two respects. First, if the judge determines 
that he falls within one of these three categories, he must disqualify 
himself regardless of whether in his opinion it is proper for him to 
sit. Second, a judge's determination that he does not fit in one of 
these categories should receive no more deference on appeal than 
any other legal conclusion. 
C. Policy Considerations in Applying Section 455 
The main problem for the challenged judge or reviewing appel-
late court when the possibility of disqualification arises is how to 
handle the close cases.101 For example, it is generally agreed that a 
97. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 3C(l)(b), 3C(I)(d), 3C(3)(a), set out in 
note 19 supra. 
98. The Code is concerned with the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality, 
and adoption of its standards would also be desirable from this standpoint. See notes 
113-20 infra and accompanying text. 
99. So far as I can ascertain, [the words "in his opinion'1 have never been con-
strued to leave it to the judge's option whether he should retire from the case if 
he were in truth interested in the suit, or had been of counsel or advised to matters 
involved in it, ••• but only leave it to his conscience and judgment to sit or not 
when from other causes he is "so connected" with either party "as to render it, in 
his opinion, improper for him to sit on the trial" of the case. 
Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 987 (l\f.D. Ala. 1912). Accord, United States 
v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969); Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 374 U.S. 853 (1963); Darlington v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 261 F.2d 903 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992 (1959); McNeil Bros. Co. v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 
1959); United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. 
Humble Oil &: Ref. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), afjd., 441 F.2d 631 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); United States Fidelity &: Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 
34 F.R.D. 121 (D. Md.), afjd., 334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964); 
In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1936), afjd., 88 F.2d 212 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937). The opposite point of view can be found in 
Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 F. 370 (4th Cir. 1901), but that case was primarily concerned 
with waiver of disqualification. 
100. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 
(1970); Voltmann v. United Fruit Co., 147 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1947). 
IOI. Compare Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
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judge should disqualify himself at the trial of a defendant whose 
prosecution was commenced while the judge was serving as United 
States attorney for the district.102 A more difficult question is pre-
sented by a case such as Adams v. United States,103 in which the 
judge presided at a trial for perjury arising out of an earlier trial in 
a district for which the judge was then United States attorney. Since 
section 455 provides for disqualification "in any case" in which a 
judge has been of counsel, there is no question that the trial judge in 
Adams would have been disqualified in any proceeding directly 
connected with the initial prosecution. The essential issue, how-
ever, was whether the word "case" in the statute should be inter-
preted so as to embrace both the original trial and the subsequent 
perjury prosecution.104 The narrow interpretation adopted in Adams 
allowed the judge to hear the perjury trial while a more expansive 
definition would have required him to disqualify himself.105 Thus, 
Adams was a close case whose outcome might have been determined 
by the court's weighing of the various policies underlying the dis-
qualification statute. While courts do not always give detailed rea-
sons for their disqualification decisions, the major factors that are 
often mentioned and that should be considered will be discussed in 
the following pages. 
The basic goal of disqualification for interest is to ensure that a 
litigant receives a fair trial. This means that there is a close connec-
tion between disqualification standards and the requirements of due 
process of law. Little has been said in the cases about the relationship 
between due process and disqualification of federal judges because 
there have been statutes governing disqualification at the federal 
level since 1792. The cases that involve disqualification for interest 
of federal judges usually turn solely on interpretation of section 455. 
There has been, however, a development of the due process ap-
proach in Supreme Court cases in which the Court scrutinized state 
court decisions under the fourteenth amendment and reviewed fed-
eral regulatory agency action under the fifth amendment. In In re 
Murchison,106 the Court stated that a "fair trial in a fair tribunal 
379 U.S. 1000 (1965) (judge wanted to disqualify but felt he had duty to hear the case), 
with United States v. Zarowitz, 326 F. Supp. 90 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (judge disqualified him-
self to avoid possible appearance of prejudice despite belief that his situation was not 
within the statute). A good exposition of the various factors to be considered by a 
judge in deciding whether he should disqualify himself can be found in United States 
v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957). 
102. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text. 
103. 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962). 
104. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
105. See 302 F.2d at 310-15 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
106. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
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is a basic requirement of due process."107 In reaching this conclusion 
the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Tumey v. Ohio,108 in 
which it held that it was unconstitutional for a justice of the peace 
to impose fines when he received a percentage of the fines. In that 
case Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, made the 
sweeping pronouncement that 
every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the 
average man as a judge ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process 
of the Iaw.100 
Similar requirements of fairness and due process have been applied 
in regulatory agency cases under the fifth amendment.110 
As a result of these cases a judge must be aware of the constitu-
tional ramifications of his disqualification decisions. This is particu-
larly true because Tumey and other due process cases appear to 
apply a standard that in some instances may go beyond the minimal 
requirements of section 455.111 Thus, a too literal interpretation of 
the statute may not meet constitutional due process requirements. 
In order to avoid facing such a constitutional problem, a judge or 
appellate court may find it necessary to read section 455 expansively 
to require disqualification in close cases.112 
Another factor to be considered in a judge's decision to dis-
qualify is the contention that the appearance of impartiality is as 
important, if not more so, than actual impartiality. In 1952, Justice 
Frankfurter explained his disqualification in a case by stating that 
"justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so 
in fact."113 The Supreme Court gave support to this view in the 
107. 349 U.S. at 136. 
108. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
109. 273 U.S. at 532. 
110. See cases cited in note 86 supra. 
111. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 41 U.S.L.W. 4011 (U.S., Nov. 14, 1972), the 
Court applied the Tumey test to hold that the mayor of a village could not preside at 
trials of traffic violations when the fines imposed went into the village treasury. This 
holding makes it unnecessary that the financial interest be a personal one to disqualify 
a judge on due process grounds. Since the historical equation of "substantial interest" 
under section 455 with a personal financial interest, see notes 68-73 supra and accom-
panying text, may not be as broad a standard as Ward and Tumey apparently require, 
the "substantial interest" provision of section 455 is an example of due process require-
ments that are broader than the traditional, narrow reading of the statute. 
112. In Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), the Supreme Court buttressed its 
construction of a Social Security Act provision, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1970), by noting 
that its choice avoided constitutional problems. "Any doubt must be resolved in favor 
of this construction to avoid the necessity of passing on the equal protection issue." 
404 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J.). 
113. Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (statement of Frank-
furter, J.). See also Rapp. v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965): "For the 
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due process context when in Murchison Justice Black wrote for the 
Court: 
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias. . . . But our 
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability 
of unfairness. . . . [T]o perform its high function in the best way 
"justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."114 
More recently the Court set aside an arbitration award and stated 
that "[a]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies 
not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance 
of bias."115 A number of lower federal courts have applied these 
statements of the Supreme Court to section 455 cases.116 
The unique power enjoyed by the judiciary in the United States 
is due in large part to the high esteem in which the courts are held.117 
That esteem is dependent to a great extent on the appearance of 
impartiality that the courts put forward. As a federal judge wrote in 
1940: 
There is perhaps no more important right to which litigants are 
entitled than they be given such a trial [free from bias]. Its im-
pairment, ipso facto, brings the court, and administrative bodies 
as well, into public disrepute, and destroys the esteem and confidence 
which they have enjoyed so generally. Time and experience have 
demonstrated that the public, as well as litigants, will tolerate the 
proper administration of justice requires of a judge not only actual impartiality, but 
also the appearance of a detached impartiality." 
114. 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JumCE, THE FUNCTION OF THE 
TRIAL JUDGE (tentative draft 1972), Standard 1.7: 
Circumstances requiring recusation. 
The trial judge should recuse himself whenever he has any doubt as to his 
ability to preside impartially in a criminal case or whenever he believes his im• 
partiality can reasonably be questioned. 
115. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). 
The case arose under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970). The 
Court manifested more concern about the impartiality of arbitrators than judges: 
[W]e should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of 
arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the 
law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. 
393 U.S. at 149. 
116. Ryan v. United States, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 
354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 
F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Zarowitz, 326 F. Supp. 90 (C.D. Cal. 1971): But 
see Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil &e Ref. Co., 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 941 (1971). 
For the attitude of federal district courts toward the appearance factor, see survey 
results in Appendix infra. 
117. "The [Supreme] Court's principal strength is the public esteem and respect it 
commands." Letter from Professor Paul Kauper, University of Michigan Law School, to 
Senator Ervin, in Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and 
Other Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (1969). See also id. at 37•38 (testi-
mony of Senator Robert Griffin); H. JACOB, JumCE IN AMERICA 13•14 (1965); D. NIMMO 
&e T. UNGS, AMERICAN PoLmCAL PA'ITERNS 438-39 (1967). 
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honest mistakes of those who pass judgment, but not the biased 
acts of those who would deprive litigants of a fair and impartial 
trial. Foremost among the responsibilities imposed upon a reviewing 
court, is to make sure that this foundation of our judicial system be 
not undermined.11s 
If public confidence in the judicial system is to be maintained, the 
courts should strive to avoid any suggestion of impropriety. One 
way to accomplish this is to avoid the appearance of partiality.119 
This argument in effect urges a judge to disqualify himself in close 
cases.120 
Another important factor in a judge's decision to disqualify him-
self should be the recently adopted Code of Judicial Conduct. It 
contains detailed provisions to guide judges in resolving challenges 
to their qualifications.121 In part the Code, with official Commentary, 
provides: 
A judge should ... observe high standards of conduct so that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.122 
llS. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 9, 20 (7th Cir. 1940) (Major, J.) 
II9. See United States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 241-42 (D.D.C. 1957): 
In these times in which the Judiciary has been recklessly attacked and its integrity 
'l'.Tongfully challenged, it is particularly important that the problem of voluntary 
disqualification be carefully considered •••• 
• • • In balancing [the relevant] factors the Court has taken into consideration 
the fact that confidence in the Judiciary is essential to the successful functioning 
of our democratic form of government. That form of government could not long 
survive if citizens could not have faith in the impartiality of judges. [The 
standards governing the administration of criminal justice] require the most scrup-
ulous concern for appearances as well as for facts. 
120. It can be argued that Congress intended the courts to avoid the appearance of 
partiality as well as the fact thereof: 
[T]he language of the statute is mandatory: "Any ••• judge of the United States 
shall disqualify himself in any case in which he ••• has been of counsel ••• " As 
to this feature of the statute, prejudice is presumed whether actually present or 
not. We believe that the language employed by Congress compels the conclusion 
that Congress was concerned with avoiding the appearance of partiality as well as 
avoiding the fact. 
United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d ll30, 1133 (6th Cir. 1969) (emphasis original). 
It has been suggested that appellate courts should give the trial judge considerable 
discretion in assessing whether the possibility of his appearing partial requires his 
disqualification. As Judge Hastie argued in his concurring opinion in Green v. Murphy, 
259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958): 
Judges from time to time elect not to try cases, which they are sure they can try 
fairly and objectively, because of their concern to avoid any substantial doubt 
which circumstances beyond their control may create in the public mind about 
the impartiality of their administration of justice in the matters at hand. But this 
consideration must be left to the discretion and sensitive perception of each trial 
judge in the circumstances of each case. It cannot effectively be controlled by ap• 
pellate rulings. 
259 F.2d at 595-96. On the other hand, it can be argued that an appellate court should 
exercise its supervisory powers in this situation, especially because it may have a more 
detached view of the circumstances than a trial judge. 
121. See note 19 supra. 
122. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCI", Canon 1. 
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A judge should ... conduct himself at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary.12a 
A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropri-
ety.124 
While the Code (and its predecessor the Canons of Judicial Ethics) 
may not be binding on a court of law, it is strong authority because 
it serves as a statement by the legal profession of what is proper 
conduct for a judge. The Supreme Court has recognized this and 
quoted the Canons in support of its decision in Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.125 Because in certain 
instances the Code's standards are broader than the literal terms of 
section 455126 and because the Code stresses the importance of the 
appearance of impartiality, it would resolve close cases by calling 
upon the judge to disqualify himself. 
Weighing in the opposite direction is the argument that fre-
quent disqualification would cause highly qualified men who have 
been active in law and politics to decline judicial appointments. 
The rationale of this argument is that such individuals would feel 
that they could not contribute to the judicial system because their 
prior activities would result in frequent disqualification.127 The only 
federal court to face such an argument rejected it in the context of 
reviewing a federal administrative proceeding.128 Since federal judge-
ships are quite prestigious, it does not seem that a particular inter-
pretation of the disqualification statute would dry up the supply of 
qualified persons willing to accept judicial appointment. Addition-
ally, disqualification for interest is normally a problem only for the 
new judge-the longer a judge is on the bench, the less likely it is 
that he will face disqualifying situations.129 
123. Id., Canon 2A. 
124. Id., Canon 2, Commentary. 
125. 393 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). Congressmen have indicated that they expect 
members of the federal judiciary to follow the Canons of Judicial Ethics. See H.R. Res. 
922, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), calling for an investigation of Justice Douglas, in part 
because of alleged violation of the Canons. This resolution, along with several others, 
was considered by a special subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, which 
recommended that he not be impeached. See STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H.R. REs, 
920 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CoNG,, 2D SESS., FINAL REPORT: AssocI-
ATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (Comm. Print 1970). 
126. See text accompanying note 58 supra. 
127. A variation on this theme is the argument that the President would be deterred 
from appointing such people to the bench because their frequent disqualification 
would dilute the impact that his appointees would otherwise have on the judicial 
system. 
128. American Cyanamid, Inc. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 1966). The 
court vacated an FTC order on the basis that the Commission's chairman should have 
disqualified himself under section 7(a} of the Administrative Procedure Act, now 5 
u.s.c. § 556(b) (1970). 
129. ABA Reporter's Notes, supra note 38, at 37. 
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Another argument against frequent disqualification is that it will 
lead, in the words of one United States circuit court, to "clogged 
courts" and "intolerable delays."130 However, such fears have been 
expressed only by courts sitting in the Far West over sixty years ago. 
At that time there were no multijudge districts, only limited provi-
sion for the use of visiting judges, and poor communication and 
transportation systems.181 Consequently, if one judge could not hear 
a case a considerable delay might ensue before another judge could 
be obtained to hear it. This is not frequently true today. We live in 
an era of almost instant communication and transportation. In 
addition, most districts have several judges132 and there are proce-
dures for using visiting judges.133 Thus, a disqualified judge usually 
can be easily and quickly replaced.134 Not surprisingly the delay 
argument does not appear to have figured in any reported disqualifi-
cation cases since 1914.135 
One of the major arguments against disqualification is that a 
judge has a duty to hear cases. There are two aspects to this duty-a 
duty to the litigants and a duty to the judicial system. If disqualifica-
tion would result in the inability of a litigant to have an expeditious 
hearing from a trial court or in the inability of an appellate court to 
gather a quorum, a judge may feel an obligation to interpret the 
statute so as to avoid disqualifying himself. Actually these situations 
should be relatively rare because of the numerous procedures avail-
able to replace disqualified judges. If such a situation does arise, 
however, it certainly justifies a narrow interpretation of the statute 
in order to avoid injustice.136 
130. Carr v. Fife, 44 F. 713 (C.C.D. Wash. 1891), affd., 156 U.S. 494 (1894). See also 
Utz &: Dunn Co. v. Regulator Co., 213 F. 315 (8th Cir. 1914); In re Sime, 22 Fed. Cas. 
145 (No. 12,860) (C.C. Cal. 1872). 
131. In 1891, there were 63 district judges, but no multijudge districts. 44 F. iv-vi 
(1891). There were limited procedures for the use of visiting judges starting in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. See Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442; Act of 
April 2, 1852, ch. 20, IO Stat. 5. The lack of adequate transportation and communica-
tion facilities made extensive use of these provisions difficult. These provisions have 
been gradually expanded over the years. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 13-19, 
36 Stat. 1089-90; Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 18, 38 Stat. 203. Current statutes dealing 
with visiting judges are codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1970). 
132. Congress has provided for 391 district judges (not counting senior district 
judges), and only 5 districts out of 90 had but one judge. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1970), as 
amended, (Supp. I, 1971). 
133. 28 u.s.c. §§ 291-96 (1970). 
134. "The result [of the radical expansion in the number of federal judges] both 
can and should be that the standard of disqualification goes up; it is so easy to put 
someone else on the case." Frank, supra note I, at 44. See also United States v. Quat-
trone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957); JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., PROCEEDINGS 16, 
48 (1971); 1971 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 400-12; 
Appendix infra. 
135. However, there are still instances in which delay may be a factor, especially in 
~inglc judge districts. See survey results in Appendix infra. 
136. Chief Justice Stone once withdrew his disqualification so that the Supreme 
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The source of the assertion that a judge has an obligation to the 
judicial system to hear cases is the judge's oath of office, in which he 
pledges to "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all 
duties incumbent upon" him.137 This oath has been cited to support 
the argument that a judge's duty to the judicial system requires 
him to sit unless he is clearly disqualified.138 Proponents of the op-
posing view argue that greater emphasis should be given to. the part 
of the oath that requires a judge to be impartial.139 
In analyzing the judge's duty to sit, it is important to recall that 
in most cases, disqualification of a judge will not result in harm to 
the parties or disrupt the judicial system. Hence, it would seem that 
ensuring fairness in fact and the appearance of impartiality should 
be given greater consideration in deciding whether disqualification 
is required than any duty to sit.140 
Another argument against resolving close cases in favor of dis-
qualification is the possibility that more frequent disqualification 
will encourage litigants to abuse the statute by advancing frivolous 
claims.141 While this argument has some merit, the weight to be 
accorded to it depends on how effectively the courts can deal with 
abuse of section 455. If a disqualification question is raised along 
with other issues on appeal from final judgment, little additional 
effort is needed to consider the disqualification claim. If the matter 
Court could assemble a quorum. See note 23 supra. A trial judge in a single-judge 
district may• feel obliged to sit in most cases because of the difficulty and delay that his 
replacement by another judge would entail. See Appendix infra. 
137. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1970). See also Pessin v. Keeneland Assn., 274 F. Supp. 513 
(E.D. Ky. 1967). 
138. "There is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there 
is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is." In re Union Leader Corp., 
292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). See also Laird v. Tatum, 
41 U.S.LW. 3208 (U.S., Oct. 10, 1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.); Edwards v. 
United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965); Bradley v. 
School Bd., 324 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Va. 1971); Pessin v. Keeneland Assn., 274 F. Supp. 513 
(E.D. Ky. 1967). 
139. E.g., United States v. Zarowitz, 326 F. Supp. 90 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
140. The duty to sit is, of course, more important on the Supreme Court level, for 
the failure of a justice to participate can prevent the Court from deciding, or even 
hearing, some cases. A disqualification could also lead to conflicting rulings from 
different circuits being affirmed by an equally divided Court, thus creating "one rule in 
Athens, and another rule in Rome." Laird v. Tatum, 41 U.S.L.W. 3208, 3211 (U.S., 
Oct. 10, 1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.) 
141. Examples of frivolous claims probably include Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853 (1963) (judge and a party belonged to the same 
international legal society); McNeil Bros. Co. v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186 {1st Cir. 1959) 
(judge had been lecturer at law school while partner of defendant was Dean); Town 
of East Haven v. Eastern Air Lines, 304 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Conn. 1969) (in suit involving 
airport noise, trial judge often ate lunch with another judge who lived near the 
airport). In McNeil, the petitioner also sought to have the judge's colleagues on the 
circuit court disqualified because of their connection with the allegedly disqualified 
judge. 
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is raised by way of the mandamus procedure, the appellate court 
can handle the issue without significant delay or cost.142 Abuse is 
most likely to be a problem when disqualification is the only 
ground for appeal after final judgment. But it may be assumed that 
the courts can sift the frivolous claims from the substantial ones and 
thereby minimize any delay. Thus, while abusive claims probably 
cannot be prevented, the courts can effectively deal with such claims 
without excessive loss of time, money, or energy.143 
Those factors that weigh against disqualification generally arise 
only in exceptional circumstances. But when they do arise, a judge 
should consider the potential injustice to the parties that may flow 
from his disqualification. On the other hand, there are strong argu-
ments in favor of a judge disqualifying himself in close cases. Such 
action is in accordance with fundamental notions of due process and 
with the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In addition, 
it would help maintain the appearance of impartiality in our judicial 
system. Questions of disqualification should be resolved so as to 
remove any shadow of doubt as to the impartiality of a judge. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As this Comment demonstrates, courts often disagree on what 
procedures and standards are proper under the disqualification for 
interest statute. Since consistent application of laws is desirable in 
any judicial system,144 it could be argued that more precise disqual-
ification standards should be established. There are three ways in 
which this could be accomplished. First, Congress could make sec-
tion 455 more detailed;145 second, the courts could informally adhere 
to the Code of Judicial Conduct; third, the Supreme Court could 
adopt rules for the lower federal courts under its general supervisory 
powers.146 All of these alternatives have the potential of creating 
142. See note 53 supra. 
143. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro• 
cedure have provisions that could be invoked against an attorney who was abusing the 
statute. FED. R. CIV. P. 11; ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL R.Esl'ONSIBILITY, Canon DR 
7-102(A)(2). In addition, a lawyer would probably be hesitant to advance a frivolous 
claim if he thought he might have to appear before the presiding judge in the future. 
Cf. notes !14-35 supra and accompanying text. For the view of district judges on abuse 
of section 455, see Appendix infra. 
144. See Laird v. Tatum, 41 U.S.L.W. 8208, 8210-11 (U.S., Oct. 10, 1972) (memoran-
dum of Rehnquist, J.). 
145. One such proposal has been introduced by Senator Birch Bayh. See S. 4201, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). His proposal, written in consultation with John Frank, 
would eliminate the possibility of waiver, require disqualification if the judge owns 
any stock in a corporate party, require disqualification if there is an appearance of 
partiality, and allow the judge to disqualify himself in any case in which he feels he 
should. The bill is set out and discussed in Frank, supra note 1. 
146. The Supreme Court has this power under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970). Some states 
also handle disqualification in this manner. See, e.g., MICH. Cr. Ruu: 405. 
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inflexibility, which could result in grave injustice in individual 
cases. Strict statutory rules would be particularly vulnerable to this 
criticism. Additionally, it might be questioned how much detailed 
interference by Congress in this aspect of court procedure is desir-
able.147 Since the Code of Judicial Conduct is the product of a non-
governmental body, it may not be an appropriate source of statutory 
law.14s 
Court rules represent probably the best of the three proposals. 
Allowing the judiciary to govern itself in such matters as disqualifica-
tion would cultivate desirable independence on the part of the 
judicial branch.149 Furthermore, it would avoid possible conflicts be-
tween Congress and the courts over what constitutes impermissible 
congressional meddling in the affairs of the judicial branch. To avoid 
injustice, such rules should be sufficiently flexible to take account of 
cases that may arise under special circumstances and require in-
dividualized treatment. The Code of Judicial Conduct might be 
valuable as a prototype for such rules. 
If disqualification standards were determined by the judiciary, 
they could be modified in light of practical experience. Working 
within the bounds of section 455, an elaboration of disqualification 
standards in the form of court rules would allow the federal courts 
to maintain both judicial prestige and consistent, fair procedures 
for litigants, and might make resort to the tedious process of case-by-
case review less frequent. 
APPENDIX 
In connection with this Comment, the author sent brief ques-
tionnaires to the chief judges of the ninety United States District 
Courts. Completed responses were received from forty-four of those 
judges.150 Each judge was asked to respond to six specific questions 
and to add any other comments or though~ he had concerning the 
147. The separation of powers question has never been an issue in the disqualifica-
tion area. This is probably due in large part to general agreement by most courts on 
the minimal standards that section 455 imposes. A law seeking to force changes in 
current judicial practice might make some courts more willing to sustain a challenge 
to a disqualification statute on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional breach of the 
separation of powers doctrine. For a discussion of the general issue, see Ervin, Separa-
tion of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 108, 121-27 (1970). 
148. Miller, supra note 18, at 71. See also Order Prescribing Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
149. Miller, supra note 18, at 72-7!1. 
150. The response rate was highest from smaller districts. Responses were received 
from 22 of the 37 districts with two or fewer judges, 14 of the 28 districts with two 
to four judges and 8 of the 26 districts with more than four judges. Geographically, 
the districts responding ranged from 6 of 18 in the Fifth Circuit and 4 of Ill in the 
Ninth to 5 of 7 in the Seventh and 8 of 10 in the Eighth Circuit. In most of the 
other circuits responses were received from at least one half of the districts. 
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operation of section 455 in his district. The responses are on file 
with the Michigan Law Review. A summary of the information 
received follows. 
I. The approximate number of disqualifications/year/judge which 
would fall under 28 U.S.C. § 455 in your district. (Even a rough 
estimate would be very helpful.) 
The range of responses to this question was broad. One chief 
judge replied that none of the judges in his district had been dis-
qualified in over ten years. At the other extreme, six chief judges 
reported that their judges disqualified themselves ten or more times 
per year. The median number of disqualifications per year per judge 
was two, while the average was approximately three and one half. 
2. The percentage of the disqualifications in your district that are 
requested by the parties (as contrasted with those on the judge's 
own motion). 
Twenty-seven of forty-two chief judges who responded to this 
question stated that all of the disqualifications in their districts were 
on the judges' own motions. Eight responses indicated that motions 
by parties prompted at least one quarter of the district's disqualifica-
tions. 
3. Do judges in your district allow parties to voluntarily waive a 
disqualification? 
The responses to this question were almost equally divided. 
Thus, while only one court has held in a reported decision that 
waiver is not allowed under the 1948 revision of section 455,151 
in practice many trial courts apparently do not allow waiver of a 
disqualification. 
It is perhaps ironic to note that although the Code of Judicial 
Conduct seems designed to reduce the number of situations in 
which waiver can occur,152 one judge stated that prior to the adop-
tion of the Code his district did not allow waiver in any instances, 
but now will allow waiver when the Code permits it. 
4. If a party does not raise the issue of disqualification in a timely 
fashion, will judges in your district hold that party to an "involun-
tary" waiver? 
Only five chief judges replied that their district practice was to 
impose "involuntary" waivers, while thirty-one reported that they 
do not impose such waivers. Again the case law does not seem to 
coincide with actual practice.153 
151. United States v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969). 
152. See ABA CooE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr, Canon 3D, set out in note 19 supra. 
153. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. 
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5. Does the replacement of a disqualified judge typically involve 
any significant delay in the ultimate resolution of a case? 
All but one of the responses from districts with just one full-time 
judge indicated that disqualifications significantly delay trials in 
those districts.154 One respondent said that he was hesitant to dis-
qualify himself because of the delay factor. 
The overwhelming majority of the respondents from multijudge 
districts replied that there was no significant delay in the replace-
ment of a disqualified judge. Only three judges stated that the delay 
would amount to more than three months. One judge estimated that 
the "delay" is normally no longer than the few minutes it takes to 
dictate a letter reassigning the case. Another suggested that it takes 
a few days for a replacement judge to familiarize himself with a 
case after the original judge has disqualified himself. The complexity 
of a case may affect the length of the delay caused by disqualification. 
For example, one judge mentioned that it took him several months 
to familiarize himself with an antitrust case that was transferred to 
him after a colleague had disqualified himself. 
6. Based on the experience of your district, do you feel that section 
455 is frequently abused? 
All but one respondent to this question indicated that litigants 
do not often abuse section 455. 
7. Do you have any other comments on the operation or signifi-
cance of section 455 in your district? I would be especially interested 
in whether judges in your district disqualify themselves to avoid a 
possible appearance of partiality even if they do not believe they fall 
within any of the statute's proscriptions. 
Twenty-four responses indicated that judges often disqualify 
themselves if there might be a possible appearance of partiality even 
though they did not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Only six 
respondents indicated that judges in their districts did not usually 
doso. 
154. Responses were received from all five one-judge districts and from three of six 
districts with one full-time judge and the services of a roving judge. 
